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Hooray for Gibberish! A Glossary of Bankruptcy Slang for
the Occasional Practitioner or Bewildered Judge1
Richard L Aaron2
INTRODUCTION
"I know you guys have your own language. But if you want me to
rule on these motions you're going to have to let me in on it," ex-
plained the United States District Judge during argument in a hearing
addressing first day orders of a corporate reorganization. Gobbledy-
gook keeps out not only the layperson; it excludes the essential pro-
fessional, too, when the short hand of the specialist becomes
incomprehensible to all but the cognoscenti.
Shorthand expression serves an essential function. "Cramdown"
captures a complex idea and is much easier to say than: "The fair and
equitable distribution of Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b) as an alter-
native to confirmation by consent defined by Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 1129(a) using the weighted majority of voting classes set out in
Bankruptcy Code section 1126."3
Bankruptcy is a fresh start for the honest but beleaguered debtor;
and, bankruptcy is a fair sharing of the inadequate assets of the debtor
amongst the trade creditors. 4 Bankruptcy is a trip to the dentist for
two root canals.5 After five-hundred years of development,6 bank-
1. Any appearance of tagging on to the brilliant Hooray for Yiddish is deliberate. Leo
Rosten, HOORAY FOR YIDDISH (Simon and Schuster, 1968). I would prefer to place the failure
to successfully capture the clarity, nuance or humor of Hooray for Yiddish upon Mr. Rosten who
had no interest in bankruptcy.
2. Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
3. United States Bankruptcy Code ("Bankruptcy Code"), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126-1129 (1978).
4. Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265 (1843); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). JAMES MACLACHLAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUFTCY § 1 (1956). See also 1 HAROLD REMINGTON & JAMES
M. HENDERSON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (5th ed.
1950): ("[T]he primary object of bankruptcy laws has come to be 'to secure a just distribution of
the bankrupt's property among his creditors; the secondary object is the release of the bank-
ruptcy from the obligation to pay his debts."); Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of Bank-
ruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, (1918) (The core of all bankruptcy systems includes collective
action by creditors against insolvent debtors, the prevention of fraud and the administration of
the debtor's estate. Some bankruptcy systems, but not all, discharge the debtor.)
5. Bankruptcy Code § 109 defines who is eligible to use bankruptcy. No where is the debtor,
individual or entity, asked, "How did you get into this mess?" SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A
FEAST FOR LAWYERS (M. Evans, New York, 1992) (an angry narrative of his company in Chap-
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ruptcy is many different experiences, solutions, and strategies, all of
them vexing to the outsider.
ter 11, principally blaming the lawyers). Shirley Nichols was profiled on The News Hour with
Jim Lehrer, Bankruptcy Law Reform, (PBS Television broadcast, June 8, 1998), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june98/bankrupt_6-8.html. She was forced into bank-
ruptcy after losing her job and home in an unsuccessful attempt to keep up with medical bills.
Grandmother Jan Cameron describes her descent into bankruptcy after loss of job and unsuc-
cessful effort at credit counseling in Jan Cameron, The problem was me: Taking responsibility for
Bankruptcy, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 6, 2005, at AA3; Ruth Ann and James Wilson are
personifications of the data base of ELIZABETH WARREN AND AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE
TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE, (2003).
See also Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, THE FRAGILE MID-
DLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT, (2000); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN
AMERICA, (1989); Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?,
41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115 (2002); Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1003
(2002); Teresa A. Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, Young, Old, and In Between:
Who Files for Bankruptcy, 2001 No. 9 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 1 (Sept. 2001); Melissa B.
Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, Medical Problems and Bankruptcy Filings, 2000
No. 5 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 1 (May 2000). The data assembled to profile consumer bank-
rupts is part of an on-going funded research Consumer Bankruptcy Project initiated in 1981.
Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Folklore and Facts: A Pre-
liminary Report from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 Am, Bankr. L. J. 293 (1986). The
most recent insight into the misfortune that is bankruptcy is David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth
Warren, Deborah Thorne, and Steffie Woolhandler, Market Watch: Illness and Injury As Con-
tributors to Bankruptcy, 24 Health Affairs No. 1 (January/February 2005) available at
www.healthaffairs.org; and reported in Reed Abelson, Study Ties Bankruptcy to Medical Bills,
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005. The study finds that forty-two percent of the polled bankrupt
debtors reported medical costs as contributing to bankruptcy, even though the vast majority of
the subjects had medical insurance.
6. Bankruptcy can be traced to Roman law through the Italian city-states and the term,
"banca rotta." English bankruptcy begins with the Act of 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 7, Ch. 4 (Eng.).
The Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., Ch. 5 (Eng.); Amendments in the Reign of
James, 1604, 1 Jam., Ch. 15 (Eng.); 1623, 21 Jam., Ch. 19 (Eng.), helped form the foundation of
English bankruptcy law until the revision in 1824, 6 Geo. 4, Ch. 16 (Eng.). A detailed discussion
of the evolution is found in 8 William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Ch. IV, § 6 at
229-45 (1926); W.G. Jones, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY (1976); Ian Duffy,
English Bankrupts 1571 - 1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1980); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The
Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401, 422-24 (1947); and E. Welbourne,
Bankruptcy Before the Era of Victorian Reform, IV CAMBR. HIST. J., 52 (1932).
English bankruptcy rose with the mercantile development of the sixteenth century. Black-
stone notes that traders deal on credit so they alone should be subject of bankruptcy. William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, 473 - 74 (1766). Orlando Bump, LAW AND
PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY 4 (Beard Books, l1th ed. 1898): ("The relief afforded and the penal-
ties denounced applied to traders; and to this class alone were proceedings in bankruptcy availa-
ble in England at the date of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, B the law
holding it to be at that time an unjustifiable practice for any person other than a trader to en-
cumber himself with debts to any consider amount."); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality,
The Merchant Character, and the History of Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 32 (1986):
("Blackstone's view reflects the success of the ideology of commerce that took hold in the eight-
eenth century and turned the morally questionable and perceptually elusive phenomena of trade
and credit into necessities, and then into virtues.").
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Chapter 7 looks backwards upon the debtor's financial wreckage to
liquidate what is left7, distribute the proceeds amongst the creditors8,
and return the unburdened individual debtor back into the market-
place.9 Other bankruptcy options look forward to pay creditors with
future income according to a confirmed plan.10 Viewed from either
direction, the assumed reach of bankruptcy is astounding.1
Whichever chapter is chosen, bankruptcy is a Carrollian place
where things are not as they are promised in the non-bankruptcy
world. 12  Obligations are eliminated. 13  Solemn contracts can be
7. Bankruptcy Code § 704(1) describes the trustee's obligation to collect the property of the
estate, expansively defined in Bankruptcy Code § 541, and turn it into cash.
8. Bankruptcy Code § 726 describes the distribution in priority from the administrative ex-
pense first priority of Bankruptcy Code § §507(a) - 503(b), through remaining priorities; on to
general claims, § 726(a)(2); general claims which are filed late, § 726(a)(3); and, after penalties
and interest, even back to the debtor if there are assets remaining, § 727(a)(6).
9. Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(1) grants the individual, i.e., not the corporate, debtor a dis-
charge unless some offense, §§ 727(a)(2) - (10), justifies denying the discharge.
10. Bankruptcy Code § 1129 describes the elements needed to confirm a plan in chapter 11;
Bankruptcy Code § 1325 describes the elements needed to confirm a plan in Chapter 13; and
Bankruptcy Code § 1225 describes the elements needed to confirm a plan in Chapter 12.
11. Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(1) reaches "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in prop-
erty ... wheresoever located and by whomever held .. " See, e.g., United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (holding that the United States must return the property seized
from the taxpayer to enforce a tax lien when the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition the day after
the seizure.) When the petition is filed, Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) purports to stop the world on
its axis by staying unilateral action by creditors. E.g., In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969 (1st Cir. 1997)
holds that a judicial foreclosure sale of a defaulted home mortgage completed after the filing of
the petition in Chapter 13 is void. In re Pierce, 91 Fed. Appx. 927 (5th Cir. 2004) unpublished,
affirms the bankruptcy court's conclusion that a sheriff's foreclosure sale thirty-minutes after the
bankruptcy petition was void.
In re Yukos Oil Co., 2004 WL 3172372 (Bankr. S.D. TX 2004), illustrates this point. The court
issues a temporary restraining order to stop the tax sale by the Russian Federation of the oil and
gas reserves in Russia, valued at $20 billion, grounding American bankruptcy court jurisdiction
upon the $2 million on deposit in a Texas bank, the retainer to its Texas law firm, and the 15%
stock interest held by American investors.
12. " 'There's no use trying,' she said: 'One can't believe impossible things.' 'I daresay you
haven't had much practice', said the Queen. 'When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-
hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."'
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, 225 THE LEWIS CARROLL BOOK (Tudor Publishing 1944).
13. Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(1), discharges an individual debtor from claims, promissory
notes, lawsuits and judgments. The corporate debtor, which cannot be discharged in Chapter 7,
may use Chapter 11 and find a discharge in Bankruptcy Code § 1141(d) and bind all participants
to the terms of the confirmed plan, Bankruptcy Code § 1141(a). In bankruptcy the claims are
expansively defined in Bankruptcy Code § 101(5) even to the point of monetizing what, outside
of bankruptcy, would be equitable relief available because the conventional money judgment is
inadequate. See, e.g. In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. MA 1996) (Injunction to enforce non-
competition covenant in a franchise is a dischargeable claim); Cf. Kennedy v. Medicap Pharma-
cies, Inc. 267 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (State law controls damage measure for breach of non-
competition covenant). To be discharged means that there is no liability on the claim. Bank-
ruptcy Code § 727(b). Any discharged judgment is voided, and the collection of the discharged
debt is enjoined. Bankruptcy Code § 524(a).
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honored or discarded. 14 Loans negotiated or welded with boilerplate
can be revised. 15 And, the rights of claimants at state law can be
reordered.16
GLOSSARY
In Humpty Dumpty fashion, 17 an explanation in context is offered
for the some of the arcanum heard in the gatherings of the bankruptcy
bar.18 Cross reference terms are signaled by italics. The etymology of
Bankruptcy is specifically entrusted to Congress by U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, ci. 4: "Congress
shall have Power To establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." Further, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, mandates that "No State shall...pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. " Therefore the discharge of a debt has
been viewed as the hallmark of federal bankruptcy. Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394
F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) (California statute for preference recovery after assignment for benefit
of creditors is preempted by federal bankruptcy). The distinguished scholar Gerrard Glenn very
much disagreed with this view: Gerrard Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation. "Now that, as
the writer believes, is wholly wrong... The real test of a bankruptcy law, it is submitted should
be quite different. It should relate to the distinction between proceedings by way of agreement
and proceedings wholly in invitum through the direct aid of the courts." §§ 124 - 125, at 210-
211.
14. Bankruptcy Code § 365 gives the choice to assume or to reject contracts and leases.
15. In Chapter 13, the debtor may "modify" the terms of a secured interest that is not a lien
on real property that is solely the debtor's residence. Bankruptcy Code §§ 1322(b)(2) and (5). In
chapter 11, the plan may similarly modify the rights of secured creditors, Bankruptcy Code
§ 1123(b)(5). Further, even if the proposed plan is rejected by the voting classes, the court may
imposed the plan on classes if the court finds that it "fair and equitable" to do so. Bankruptcy
Code § 1129(b).
16. Bankruptcy Code § 364(d)(1): "The court. . .may authorize the obtaining of
credit.. .secured by a senior or equal lien .. " Bankruptcy Code § 510(c) .... [T]he court may
(1) under principles of equitable subordination subordinate for purposes of distribution all or
part of an allowed claim..." Bankruptcy Code §§ 503, 507, and 726 define the priorities by
which claims shall be recognized.
17. " 'That's a great deal to make one word mean,' Alice said in a thoughtful tone. 'When I
make a word do a lot of work like that,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'I always pay it extra."' ALICE IN
WONDERLAND (Disney 1951).
18. There is no claim that the list of terms is exhaustive. Some line-drawing is necessary and
debatable. "Predatory lending" may be a good example. It is not included in this glossary.
Some borrowers with impaired credit may seek financing from "sub-prime lenders." The prac-
tices of some lenders in this market are abusive of the debtors. These might include loan to
value ratios that foretell disaster, loan flipping, fraudulent misrepresentation, boilerplate waiver
of important protections, and high pressure sales strategies. The scope and character of the
lending is detailed in many sources including: United States Gov't Accounting Office Report
GAO-04-280 Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating
Predatory Lending, 18 (March 2004) (describing the attributes of predatory lending); Kathleen
C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1259 -1270 ("Predatory Lending" defined); and Leetra Harris and
Brian Nichols, Legislative Review: Banking and Finance, 19 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 14 - 45 (2002)
(The practices and debate leading to enactment of 2002 Ga. Laws 455 curtailing predatory
lending).
Borrowers in financial distress will consider bankruptcy as a remedy. E.g., In re Johnson, 292
B.R. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003)(dismissing title insurer and its agent from chapter 13 debtor's
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the term is not pursued here, as the origins of "eat dirt plan" are prob-
ably best left obscure.
Absolute Priority. Before investors can participate in a reorganiza-
tion, the non-consenting senior debt classes must be fully paid. The
secured creditor must be paid before the unsecured creditor; and the
unsecured creditor must be paid before the ownership interest can
survive. 19
"I should take your promise to pay the $50,000 on my equipment
when you guys stiffed me on my security interest and filed bankruptcy
when I threatened to repossess? And the trade gets 10 cents on the
dollar while you guys keep the business? I'm not that crazy."
The problem arises particularly in Chapter 11 cramdown where plan
confirmation is without the consent of all of the classes of creditors.
The concept is expressed statutorily as the "fair and equitable" criteria
found in Bankruptcy Code sections 1129(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). The
controversial response is the new value offering where the equity in-
terest of the insolvent debtor cannot participate unless the equity in-
terest purchases an interest in the debtor. See, also, sweat equity.
Auction. At one level, public outcry is the obvious mode of selling
off assets of the estate.20
action against multiple defendants alleging predatory lending in the refinancing of debtor's
home mortgage); In re Maxwell, 281 B.R. 101 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (granting partial summary
judgment on various issues to Chapter 13 debtor's action against multiple defendants alleging
that the refinancing of her home mortgage was predatory, including ground that loan was uncon-
scionable under state law). The Supreme Court recently defined the rate of interest appropriate
in achieving the value for cramdown in Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a)(5) in Till v. SCS Credit
Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). While not involving predatory lending practices, the sub prime
lender claimed a contract rate of interest significantly above conventional market rates which the
Court rejected as the appropriate measure.
However, the issues are not distinctive to bankruptcy and are resolved in a variety of contexts
such as foreclosure proceedings. The most dramatic recent example is a British case in which the
initial home improvement loan of £7000 ended up in a claim by the mortgage lender of £384,000
after several years of default fees and late interest penalties accumulated. The trial court held
that the predatory character of the loan terms made the loan unenforceable. Russell Jenkins,
Judge Writes Off Couples 'Ufair' Debt of £400,000, TIMES (LONDON), October 29, 2004, at 1.
19. Walter J. Blum and Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 652 (1974). The rule is long standing. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-505 (1913) (rule applied in railroad reorganizations pre-dating the bank-
ruptcy business reorganization). Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116
(1939) (the Boyd rule applies in corporate reorganization designed in former Bankruptcy Act
§77B).
20. Bankruptcy Code § 363(b) authorizes the trustee to sell bankruptcy property at a sale
approved by the bankruptcy court. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 6004(0(1) permits private or public
sale. Whatever is most likely to produce the highest recovery for the estate is the guiding princi-
ple. See, e.g. In re Mickey Thomson Entm't Group, Inc., 292 B.R. 415 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003)
(purported motion to approve settlement was really the sale of an estate chose in action for
which a bidder offered a higher price).
2005]
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At another level, it is a theoretical critique of Chapter 11, arguing
that distribution in Chapter 11 is hobbled by the inherently flawed
judicial valuation process, and should be replaced by public sale as a
more accurate measure of market valuation.21
Bad Faith. No where is bad faith stated as an eligibility criteria for
bankruptcy but it is everywhere applied, especially by judges of courts
of equity, which bankruptcy is, and with varying intensity.22
Bankruptcy remote. "I'll take the cash. You can have the cause of
action." A financing arrangement especially popular in financing of
single-entity real estate ventures to avoid bankruptcy. The financed as-
sets are placed in one entity which issues debt documents acquired by
the investors or lenders. The entity charter has conditions such as cor-
porate by-laws that require the unanimous directors' consent to bank-
ruptcy to file a voluntary petition and an independent director sits
who will not join in any such petition.23 The strategy may not be com-
pletely effective as illustrated by In re Kingston Square Ass'n. where
involuntary petitions were successfully filed against the entities even
21. See, e.g. Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, HARVARD UNIV.
PRESS, 1986, at 210-224 (elimination of Chapter 11 would promote sale of the reorganized debtor
through chapter 7 public sale of securities); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,
36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993); ("The case for the mandatory auction is easiest when the firm in
question is publicly traded. It is not enough, however, to assert that a regime of mandatory
auctions for these firms is superior to existing Chapter 11. One needs to ask if there are possible
reforms in which one can have the best of both worlds and ensure that early auctions take place
when it is in everyone's interest, but not otherwise."); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and
Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 107 (1991) ("Insights
from auction theory can help creditors and potential investors to quantify the owners' perceived
value of the debtor, and can facilitate the transfer of that value to the debtors' creditors."); and
Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 127,
145 (1986) ("The thrust of the argument presented in this paper is that the owners of a firm,
especially a publicly held firm, would likely prefer a sale of the firm outright to whomever was
willing to pay the most for it.").
22. "Chapter 11 bankruptcy is not supposed to be like a '7-11' convenience store ... [for
debtor to pick and choose]." In re Silberkraus, 253 B.R. 890, 903 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 2000), affd
336 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003) (debtor and debtor's attorney sanctioned for bad faith filing to avoid
executory contract). The results are about as coherent as one would expect where the measure is
the indignation level of the judge or the proverbial chancellor's foot. Justice Brennan, for exam-
ple, applauds the strategy of Texaco in selecting bankruptcy to fend off the Pennzoil judgment on
appeal when an appeal bond would exceed the appellant's worth. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
481 U.S. 1 (1987),( Brennan, J., concurring). Other courts have said that using bankruptcy to
avoid paying for a supersedeas bond while seeking a stay of judgment is bad faith. In the Matter
of Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Chu, 253 B.R. 92 (C.D. Calif. 2000);
Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 232 B.R.; 806 (M.D. Fla. 1999); In re Harvey, 101 B.R. 250
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1989); In re Davis, 93 B.R. 501 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); and In re Karum, 66
B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986).
23. Harold S. Novikoff and Barbara S. Kohl, Bankruptcy "Proofing": Bankruptcy Remote Ve-
hicles and Bankruptcy Waivers, ALI-ABA Chapter 11 Reorganizations, February 24, 2000; City
Bar Assoc. of New York, Structured Financing, 50 Bus. LAW 527 (1995)
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though the petitioning creditors were solicited by the directors of the
debtor.2 4
The term does not refer to the wiley debtor who seeks to hide assets
in some remote corner of the earth. Compare Chapter 747.
Best-interest-of-creditors test. The threshold confirmation standard
that Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 plan must provide creditors with more
than liquidation through Chapter 7. Bankruptcy Code section
1129(a)(7) and Bankruptcy Code section 1325(a)(4).
Boot strap plan. A plan funded from future income to the reorga-
nized debtor.2 5
Break-up fee. An incentive offered to prospective buyers or banks
which fund the reorganization to incur the expense of investigating
and valuing the debtor.26
Burial Expenses. As in real life, so also in business life, the expense
of disposing of the deceased must be paid ahead of creditors of the
living debtor. The expenses of administration in liquidating Chapter 7
after conversion from an unsuccessful Chapter 11, Chapter 12, or
Chapter 13 have priority over administrative expenses allowed in the
pre-conversion case. This is the rule stated in Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 726(b). 27 Also, see disgorge.
24. In re Kingston Square Assoc., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
25. See, e.g., In re Duratech Indus., Inc., 241 B.R. 291, 295 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1999).
26. "A 'break-up fee' is a fee paid to a potential acquiror of a business, or certain assets, by
the seller, in the event that the transaction contemplated fails to be consummated and certain
criteria in the purchase agreement are met. The condition most commonly giving rise to the
payment of a break-up fee is the seller's acceptance of a later bid. Break-up fees may take the
form of paying the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in arranging the deal, including due dili-
gence expenses, or break-up fees may be wholly independent of the transaction costs." In re
Integrated Resources Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) aff d 147 B.R. 650, 655, and
657 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(break-up fee to bank approved over the objection of some committees).
27. ". . . [E]xcept that in a case that has been converted to this chapter under section 1009,
1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title, a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title incurred under
this chapter after such conversion has priority over a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this
title incurred under any other chapter of this title..." In re LPM Corp., 300 F.3d 1134, 1137
(2002); see also, In re MacNeil, 102 B.R. 766 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989) (declaration of Chapter 7
administrative expenses over Chapter 11 super priority) vacated, 907 F. 2d 903 (9th Cir. 1990)
upon grounds that opinion was advisory when requisite factual determination was missing; In re
Canton Jubilee, Inc., 253 B.R. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000) (fact that sale was completed in
Chapter 7 does not transform Chapter 11 expenses in promoting sale into Chapter 7 administra-
tive expenses); In re Summit Ventures, Inc., 135 B.R. 478 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991) (The super-
priority of the post-petition financer to Chapter 11 debtor was subordinate to the Chapter 7
administrative expenses); In re California Devices, Inc., 126 B.R. 82 (Bankr. N.D. CA 1991)
(burial expenses have priority over Chapter 11 adequate protection payments); In re Rittenouse,
76 B.R. 610 (Bankr. S.D. OH 1987) (attorney's fees earned in Chapter 11 would be paid at the
conclusion of Chapter 7 if there are sufficient funds available); In re IML Freight, Inc., 52 B.R.
124, 134 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (Chapter 11 administrative fees may not be paid if Chapter 7
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Business judgment. "The courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge
is not a business consultant. '28
Bustout Also, bust-out. Acquiring assets on credit and discharging
the debt through bankruptcy. As to a business plan to acquire inven-
tory or equipment with intent to defraud the vendors, it is a crime. 29
As to an individual with a credit card, it may or may not result in
discharge of the debt.30
Carve Out. Fee arrangements for the debtor's attorney paid out of
the assets secured to the bank.31
administrative estate is insufficient ); and In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.1982) (Chapter 11 attorney subordinated).
Interim fees paid in Chapter 11 may have to be disgorged for improvident payment in light of
subsequent events. United States Trustee v. Johnston, 189 B.R. 676, 677 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (at-
torney ordered to disgorge a portion of interim fee award paid in Chapter 11 after conversion to
Chapter 7); In re Metro. Elec. Supply Corp., 185 B.R. 505 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); In re Lochmil-
ler Industries, Inc., 178 B.R. 241, 251 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995). Cf. In re Unitcast, Inc., 219 B.R.
741 (BAP 6th Cir. 1998) (order to disgorge interim fees is discretionary, not mandatory, and
bankruptcy judge properly exercised discretion not to order fees returned). But, In re Print-
crafters, Inc., 233 B.R. 113 (D. Colo 1999) (holding that Colorado law recognizes attorney's lien
as a possessory security interest, thus protecting the Chapter 11 retainer to the extent that the
work was performed at the time of the conversion to Chapter 7.)
28. In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (bankruptcy judge
should not interfere with business decision to bale haycrop by roll baling rather than square
baling).
29. Isaak v. Trumbull Savings and Loan Co, 169 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mohammed, 53 F.3d 1426 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Tashjian, 660 F2d 829 (1st Cir. 1981); and United States v. Hewes, 792 F.2d 1302
(11th Cir. 1984).
30. Compare In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir. 2000)(debts are not discharged); with In re
Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000)(debts are discharged).
31. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000). (unani-
mously holding that a recovery of expenses for preservation of estate assets by Bankruptcy Code
§ 506(c) may be imposed on the secured creditor only at the behest of the trustee).
In re Hamakua Sugar Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 211 (9th Cir. 1997) (pro rata distribution from carve
out fund created in post-petition financing order did not require attorneys to give release to
bank before payment); In re Twenty-Six Realty Assocs., L.P., 1995 WL 17012 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(paying debtor's counsel from carve out fund created by secured lender was not a conflict of
interest); In re Lavelle Aircraft Co., 1995 WL 334325 (E.D. Pa.1995) (excluding creditors com-
mittee counsel from carve out fund was within discretion of the bankruptcy court); In re Hotel
Syracuse, 275 B.R. 679 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2002) (carve out for payment of debtor's counsel but
not committee counsel did not violate bankruptcy priorities); In re Nuclear Imaging Sys. Inc., 270
B.R. 365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (carve out in Chapter 11 did not become estate property after
conversion to Chapter 7); In re EWI, Inc., 208 B.R. 885 (Bankr N.D. Ohio 1997) (carve out fund
extended to attorney for financial advisor in sale of division of the debtor); In re Blackwood
Assocs., L.P., 187 B.R.856 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stipulation defined access to carve out fund
so that on failure and lender's exercise of rights to cash collateral attorney no longer was entitled
to payment from the fund);Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 156 B.R.
608 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (court was not required to provide counsel for committee payment
through carve-out fund); In re Evanston Beauty Supply, Inc., 136 B.R. 171(Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1992)
(stipulation for carve out fund controlled payment for attorneys' fees and precluded claim under
theory of benefitting the estate); and In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34 (Bankr.
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Cash Out. Paying off the secured creditor in Chapter 11 to satisfy
the rule of absolute priority.
Chapter 20 bankruptcy. A Chapter 7 petition followed promptly by
a Chapter 13 petition. The objective is to reduce the amount of debt
through Chapter 7 so that the Chapter 13 plan can offer more pay-
ment to the debts which are not dischargeable through Chapter 7, but
which are discharged through Chapter 13's super discharge.32 The Su-
preme Court has upheld this strategy in Johnson v. Home State
Bank.33 Chapter 10 bankruptcy is rejected, however, in In re Turner.34
The debtor sought to file a Chapter 13 petition while the Chapter 7
petition was still pending, that is, one-half of each chapter or 6 1/2 and
3 1/2 = 10. In re Keach reaches the opposite conclusion. 35
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (carve out for professional fees is necessary to assure good representation in
Chapter 11).
For more extended analysis see: Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002) (the limitations of Bankruptcy Code § 506(c)
and the utility of carve out agreements); Richard I. Aaron, "Carve-Out" As A Noun, 7 J. OF
BANKR. L. AND PRAc. 487 (1998) (proposal to amend U.C.C. to support carve-out is opposed);
Craig B. Cooper, The Priority of Post-petition Retainers, Carve-outs, and Interim Compensation
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2337 (1994) (arguing that interim compensa-
tion should be final payment, of which carve-out is one example); James S. Cole, The "Carve
Out" From Liens and Priorities to Guarantee Payments in Chapter 11, 1993 DET. COLLEGE OF L.
REV. 1499(criticizing misuse of carve out); David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and Expenses
of Bankruptcy Administration, 70 N.C. L. REV. 423, 448 (1992) (criticizing carve out for attor-
neys from postpetition lender as thwarting the limitations on Bankruptcy Code § 506 as found by
some courts); and Bruce Henoch, Note, Postpetition Financing: Is There Life After Debt, 8
BANKR. DEV. J. 575, 601 (1991) (carve out is one facet of the array of postpetition financing
devices).
32. Bankruptcy Code § 1328(a) permits the discharge of debts by the completed Chapter 13
plan which are excepted from Chapter 7 discharge by Bankruptcy Code § 523. A major example
would be debts incurred by the misrepresentation of credit.
33. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991) (holding that it is not a bad faith filing
per se).
34. In re Turner 207 B.R. 373 (B.A.P. 2nd Cir. 1997) (ruling that the Chapter 13 petition filed
before discharge in Chapter 7 was a nullity. The ruling was in the context of debtors' claim that
the automatic stay barred a foreclosure sale which took place after the automatic stay in their
Chapter 7 case was lifted to facilitate the sale. The Chapter 13 petition was presumably in the
clerk's office at the time of the foreclosure sale since the mail was delivered, but the petition was
not time-stamped until an hour after the foreclosure sale.)
35. In re Keach, 243 B.R. 851 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (holding this strategy was permissible,
under the circumstances of the case, and reversed dismissal of the petition by the bankruptcy
court. The state court jury found that the building contract dispute which prompted the debtor
to walk off of the job was a deceptive practice and awarded punitive as well as compensatory
damages. The bankruptcy court ruled that the state court judgment determined the non-dis-
chargeability objection by the creditor in the Chapter 7 case, and refused the motion to convert
to Chapter 13 because the total amount of the debts, at that time, exceeded the eligibility limit.
Meanwhile an appeal of the issue preclusion ruling on the non-dischargeability was fumbled and
withdrawn and the judgment creditor pursued her now non-dischargeable claim. The opinion by
Judge Queenan includes his usual exhaustive review of the meaning of good faith from the prior
Bankruptcy Act through the present to conclude that filing Chapter 13 after the discharge order
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Chapter 22 or 33 bankruptcy. The business debtor who finds bank-
ruptcy relief through Chapter 11 so enticing that it files again and
again. US Airways, Continental Airlines and Trump Casinos are
examples.
Chapter 747 bankruptcy. The debtor who flees off shore to avoid
the American creditors. Two debtors from opposite ends of the spec-
trum may choose this form of relief. One is the immigrant consumed
by the American consumer marketplace. The other is the believer in
the offshore asset protection trust.
The second debtor simply wants to send his property fleeing. It is
not likely to be successful. Bankruptcy Code section 541(a)(1) boldly
claims "...all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in prop-
erty. ." ". . .wherever located and by whomever held.... ." It is true
that there is an exception in Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) to
trusts that include asset protection trusts like spendthrift trusts, but
American legal policy is against self-settled trusts. Thus, the debtor's
choice to go offshore. The bankruptcy courts are skeptical about the
debtor's claim of no more interest in the trust which the debtor cre-
ated and funded. Courts have used the power of contempt to coerce
repatriation of the assets. 36 Compare, bankruptcy remote.
Cramdown. Also, Cram down. A vernacular expression of forcing
the plan upon an unwilling creditor class, ie, cramming it down the
throat of the creditor.
In Chapter 11 cases, the plan of reorganization may be confirmed
by the consent of the creditors and interests voting in classes; 37 or may
be coerced upon objecting creditors who reject the plan in their class
vote. Cramdown is expressed statutorily in Bankruptcy Code
but before conclusion of the Chapter 7, for the objective of coercing the judgment creditor with a
5% lump sum payment, was not bad faith.
36. See, e.g. In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (penalty of $10,000 per day
plus incarceration ordered against debtor claiming trust protected by the Republic of Mauritius);
In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying debtor's motion for summary judg-
ment in creditor's adversary proceeding to deny discharge finding debtor had interest in trust
created in Jersey so factual issue about failure to list assets arose). Also, an important non-
bankruptcy case is Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999)
(sustaining contempt order against judgment debtors' defense of inability to comply because of
terms of Cook Island's trust). However, S.E.C. v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2000) held that
the repatriation order of the District Court of New York violated the automatic stay imposed in
the New Jersey bankruptcy of the debtor because the order was an attempt to collect a money
judgment and excepted from the exception in Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(4). The majority ac-
knowledged that ". . .the question is a close one...", and Judge Calabresi dissented.
37. Voting is by classes according to the weighted majority expressed in Bankrutpcy Code
§ 1126. A disputed issue is the degree to which classes may be gerrymandered to control the
outcome of the voting.
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§1129(b) as the "fair and equitable" standard. See also, absolute
priority.
In Chapter 13 cases cramdown is expressed statutorily in Bank-
ruptcy Code section 1325(a)(5)(B) which requires the secured creditor
to accept payments for the statutorily defined value of the collateral
using Bankruptcy Code section 506(a). That provision recognizes the
sometimes rapid disjoinder between the amount promised in the
debtor's note and the recovery which the lender can make disposing
of the collateral in the market: "Drive it off of the lot, and it depreci-
ates 20%." This common devaluation of the collateral is not
"cramdown". Compare lien stripping.
Critical vendor. "You don't pay, I don't ship. I don't ship, you close
down." A creditor who claims to be essential to the reorganization of
the debtor and demands full payment for pre-bankruptcy debt.
Courts disagree as to the authority to meet such demands as it
amounts to a preference of the creditor.38 See doctrine of necessity.
Cross Collateralization. "I can't provide heat to Tiny Tim on Christ-
mas Eve because I can't pay for the heating oil to be delivered." Con-
ditioning the financing to the debtor upon securitization of the pre-
petition debt.39
Debt for dirt. See Eat Dirt Plan.
Delawarization. See, National Bankruptcy Court of Delaware
Disgorge. "My name is Big Julie. The United States trustee sent
me to collect. Now!" Attorneys have been ordered to disgorge fees
which they have been paid prior to court approval; been paid without
satisfying requirements of accounting or disinterestedness; or been
38. For example the Seventh Circuit held in the Kmart case that an order paying critical ven-
dors must be supported by a showing that the other creditors would be benefitted. In re Kmart,
359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004). The district court denied any authority to go beyond statutory
priorities in In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (priority wage claims could be
paid but not trade claims). Compare, however, In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D.
DE 1999) which allows payment of vendors of popular brands like Nike, New Balance, Reebok,
Adidas because customers will not come to the debtor's stores without such stock. The toolmak-
ers supplying debtors' divisions were paid in In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 1021
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) to enable debtor to survive in a highly competitive environment.
Wages and benefits for active employees were authorized in In re Ionosphere Club, Inc., 98 B.R.
174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) but striking employees could not be paid.
39. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., Inc., 834 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1987) (following emergency
telephonic hearing, the bankruptcy court perfected the funding to the debtor who supplied heat-
ing oil to customers in the Michigan Upper Peninsula the week of Christmas). As in In re Adams
Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1987), the cross-collateralization may not be specifically
sanctioned as much as immunized from any attack upon the lending or granting of a lien for
credit by the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 364(e). Compare, In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963
F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting this defense and held squarely that cross-collateralization
was not with the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 364 or the equitable powers of the court).
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paid improvidently in light of subsequent events. 40 Also, see, burial
expenses.
DIP. The debtor-in-possession is the norm in Chapter 11 with au-
thority to operate the business.41 A trustee may displace the debtor-
in-possession only upon a showing of mismanagement or fraud. 42
Dirt for debt. See Eat Dirt Plan.
Disinterested. A requirement to qualify for appointment of the at-
torney for the debtor-in-possession or the trustee in bankruptcy. 43
Doctrine of Necessity. Payment of pre-petition claims immediately
because claimants are essential to debtor's survival. Also known as
the "necessity of payment doctrine" or "emergency preferential or-
ders". The doctrine of necessity is found in the railroad reorganiza-
tion practice that precedes the bankruptcy reorganization of the
twentieth century.44 The issue is the legitimacy of its current exis-
tence. See discussion at critical vendor and First Day Orders.
DOPE. The debtor out of possession in Chapter 11 because a trus-
tee has been appointed pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 1104.
40. Interim fees paid in Chapter 11 may have to be disgorged for improvident payment in
light of subsequent events. United States Trustee v. Johnston, 189 B.R. 676, 677 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1995) (attorney ordered to disgorge a portion of interim fee award paid in chapter 11 after
conversion to Chapter 7); In re Metropolitan Electric Supply Corp., 185 B.R. 505 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1995); In re Lochmiller Industries, Inc., 178 B.R. 241, 251 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995). Cf. In re
Unitcast, Inc., 219 B.R. 741 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (order to disgorge interim fees is discretion-
ary, not mandatory, and bankruptcy judge properly exercised discretion not to order fees re-
turned). But, In re Printcrafters, Inc., 233 B.R. 113 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) held that Colorado
law recognizes attorneys lien as a possessory security interest, thus protecting the Chapter 11
retainer to the extent that the work was performed at the time of the conversion to Chapter 7.
41. Bankruptcy Code § § 1101(1), 1107 and 1108.
42. Bankruptcy Code § 1104.
43. Bankruptcy Code § 327(a) as defined, Bankruptcy Code § 101(14). See, e.g. In re Pil-
lowtex, Inc., 304 F.3d 246 (3rd Cir. 2002) (hearing required to determine whether payment of
fees was preferential despite offer to return fees and waive any claim to them); In re First Jersey
Securities, Inc., 180 F.3d 504 (3rd Cir. 1999) (law firm was a preferred creditor by virtue of
payment of pre-petition services and not disinterested); In re Arochem Corp., 176 F.3d 610 (2nd
Cir. 1999) (special counsel was not disabled from representation in limited context in Chapter 11
because of pre-bankruptcy representation of a shareholder and director); In re Federated Dep't.
Stores, 44 F.3d 1310 (6th Cir. 1995) (financial advisor to the Chapter 11 debtor was not disinter-
ested and must disgorge fees); In re Prince, 40 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994) (the attorney who
represented both the debtor and the debtor's spouse had a conflict of interest which warranted
the denial of fees); and In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) affd en banc, 75 B .R.
402 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) (the attorney who represented the officers of the family corporation
as well as the corporation was owed fees for non- bankruptcy related work was not disinter-
ested). R. Craig Smith, Conflicts of Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Increase
Confidence in the Bankruptcy System, 8 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICs 1045 (1995) (the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct should be the measure for conflicts of interest in bankruptcy).
44. Russell A.Eisenberg and Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters,
73 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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Double Deeming. Bankruptcy Code section 1111(a) states that
claims listed on the Chapter 11 schedules as undisputed and fixed do
not require the filing of a proof of claim. They are "deemed" filed
within Bankruptcy Code section 501. Then, Bankruptcy Code section
502(a) deems filed claims as allowed clams. In Chapter 11, creditors
whose claims are not contested need not file proofs of their claim be-
cause "double deeming" recognizes them as allowed claims for treat-
ment under the plan of reorganization.
45
Drop Dead Clause. A provision which allows relief from the auto-
matic stay imposed by Bankruptcy Code section 362 when specified
default occurs.46
Eat Dirt Plan. "You can have the 30 lots next to the swamp, which
my expert swears is worth much more than your mortgage debt, and
I'll keep the 20 wooded lots to sell off to fund my plan."
A reorganization plan which claims to satisfy Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) or Bankruptcy Code section 1325(5)(C) by of-
fering the secured party a part of land pledged as its collateral. The
debtor asserts that this is the "indubitable equivalent" of the value of
45. What happens to the claim if the Chapter 11 case is converted to a Chapter 7 case? Fed.
R. Bankr. Proc. 1019(3) effects "triple deeming" by deeming the claims filed in Chapter 11, filed
in the superceding Chapter 7.
46. The provision may arise in settlement of early proceedings to lift the stay or provide fi-
nancing to the reorganizing debtor; or may precede the bankruptcy case, that is, a prepetition
waiver. The vitality of such provisions is unsettled. E.g., In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1996) (holding that the waiver of the automatic stay obtained prior to bankruptcy in loan
negotiation was not enforceable); and In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. Mass. 1994) (waiver of
automatic stay obtained in prior Chapter 11 was not self-executing and required motion for
relief from the stay). Lines may be drawn between single-asset Chapter 11 cases and other cases.
E.g., In re Shady Grove Tech. Center Assoc., LP, 227 B.R. 422 (Bankr. D Md. 1998) (lender met
burden of showing that waiver in sophisticated workout should be enforced); In re Archway
Apartments, Ltd., 206 B.R. 463 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1997) (a provision should limit the time for
confirmation of a single-asset Chapter 11 plan of reorganization). The power of the clause may
be limited to the case while actively administered. E.g., In re Diviney, 225 B.R. 762 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 1998) (drop dead clause did not survive confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan). Cases are
reviewed in Neil J. Siegel, Waiving (Some of) Your Bankruptcy Rights Before You File - Should
You Be Worried? 74 CONN. BAR J. 115 (2000). Further analysis is found in Irving D. Labovitz, A
Review of Current Cases and Developing Trends Considering the Efficacy of Section 362 Auto-
matic Stay Waivers in Commercial Mortgages, Or, "What Do You Have To Lose"?, 103 COMM. L.
J. 271 (1998); Mark F. Hebblein, Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: The
Economic Case for Nonenforcement, 115 BANKING L.J. 126 (1998); and Michael St. Patrick Bax-
ter, Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay: A Secured Lender Guide, 52 Bus.LAw. 577 (1997).
The provision would usually be a deal struck between lender and debtor, but it may be im-
posed by the court. See, e.g., In the Matter of Mendoza, 111 F.3d 1264 (5th Cir. 1997) (it was not
an abuse of discretion for bankruptcy judge to impose a "drop dead" clause when modifying the
Chapter 13 confirmed plan).
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the secured party's claim and the plan may be confirmed without the
secured party's assent (that is "crammed down"). 47
Effective date [of the plan]. The date designated in the confirmed
plan for the plan to take effect. Usually this date is the first day on
which the confirmation order becomes final.48
Equity Cushion. The amount left in the value of the collateral after
the lien[s] is/are satisfied. The issue is whether an equity cushion es-
tablishes the adequate protection which Bankruptcy Code section 361
47. The courts have not been warm to such plans. An eat dirt plan shifts the risk of selling the
property and its future value from the debtor to the lender. The eat dirt plan expresses great
confidence in the valuation made by the bankruptcy court. The statutory question in Chapter 11
is whether such a plan is the indubitable equivalent promised in Bankruptcy Code
§ 1129(b)(A)(iii)? In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 85 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1054 (1997) (holding that a plan which offered the secured party 566.5 acres of the 1320
acres pledged to the debtor under a deed of trust was not the indubitable equivalent. The bank-
ruptcy court valued the land at $7300 per acre and concluded that the $4,135,450 for the 566.6
acres was more than sufficient to satisfy the $3,837,618 secured claim. The Bankruptcy Appel-
late Court and the affirming Ninth Circuit were suspicious of placing such confidence in judicial
determinations of value even though the court did not find the valuation erroneous. In contrast
the Fifth Circuit held that surrender of all of the secured party's collateral was the indubitable
equivalent). Matter of Sandy Ridge Development Corp., 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989). Courts
have said that the partial surrender of land of a sufficient value to satisfy the oversecured credi-
tor should be the indubitable equivalent but have denied confirmation of the particular plans
before the court: In re Fay Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 225 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.C. 1998); In re May
174 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994); In the Matter of Martindale, 125 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1991); and In re Walat Farms, 70 B.R. 330 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988). In re Atlanta Southern
Bus. Park Ltd., 173 B.R. 444 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (confirming such a plan). In Chapter 12
and Chapter 13, the Second Circuit and Firth Circuit have ruled that the plan can either "surren-
der" all of the collateral or "distribute a value" that may be only a part of the collateral. This
recognizes the choice of Bankruptcy Code § 1225(a)(5)(B) or (C) and Bankruptcy Code
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) or (C). In re Williams, 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999); see also In re Kerwin, 996
F.2d 552 (2nd Cir. 1993).
48. The "effective date of the plan" is not a defined term even though the confirmed plan has
binding effect. Bankruptcy Code § 1141. Yet there are many complex issues that center on the
date when the plan becomes operative. E.g., certain priority claims must be cashed out on that
date. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(9)(B) and (C). Valuations made at various stages of the pro-
ceeding are no longer accurate. In re Potomac Iron Works, Inc.1997 WL 836529 (Bankr. D. Md.
1997) (holding the effective date selected must be reasonable and one year after confirmation to
allow the debtor to collect receivables needed to fund the plan was not reasonable). Also, foot-
note 1 listing sections referencing "effective date of the plan." The effective date cannot be on
the date of the petition and must be not earlier than the confirmation. In re Musil 99 Bankr. 448
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1987). The issue is analysed in In re Jones, 32 Bankr. 951, 958 n.13 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1983) (payments to unimpair creditors could not be made after the effective date of the
plan); and In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co., Inc., 36 B.R. 159, 166-167 (Bankr. D. Utah
1983)(contract rate of interest should govern amount paid to oversecured creditor). Benjamin
Weintraub and Michael J. Crames, Deferring Consummation, Effective Date or Reorganization
and Retention of Postconfirmation Jurisdiction: Suggested Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
and Bankruptcy Rules, 64 AM. BANKR. L. J. 245 (1990).
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promises to stayed creditors. In re Alyucan Interstate discusses the
issue and concludes that it is not.
49
Exclusivity. Facilis descensus Averno est.50 The same friendly folk
who brought the business to ruin are now in charge! The privilege of
the debtor to propose the plan of reorganization without having to
confront competing plans. It is specifically provided by Bankruptcy
Code section 1121(b) and is one of the most valued facets of Chapter
11.51
First Day Orders. The orders requested by the debtor, and some
creditors, to implement the Chapter 11 proceedings necessary at the
very outset of the case. These would typically include orders for bank
accounts, financing to meet immediate needs like payroll and the
like.5 2
49. 12 B.R. 803 (Bankr. Utah 1981).
50. Aeneid. Book VI, 126. Virgil (70 B.C.E. - 19 B.C.E.). Roughly, "The road to hell is paved
with good intentions."
51. "In large Chapter 11 cases the right of exclusivity is one of the main sources of debtor, and
therefore management, leverage. Because exclusivity matters, many judges have used hearings
on extension of exclusivity as status conferences. Particularly in the Southern District of New
York, extensions are likely to be doled out routinely .... Such policies leave creditors with
virtually no alternative but to negotiate a consensual plan." LYNN M. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES
FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS, § 11.07, 544 (3rd ed. Aspen Law & Business
1997). "The right to propose a plan is one of the fundamental powers to be exercised in a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization. To the extent that the debtor retains an exclusive right, it not only retains
control over the management of the case, it is also able to exercise increased negotiating lever-
age over its creditors." REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT, Recommendation Chapter 11 A.1. to grant expedited
appeal of orders on 1121 (Final Report, Revised ed. 1997). See also ELIZABETH WARREN, BusI-
NESS BANKRUPTCY 126 (1993) (discussing strategic value). Gov't document JU 13:2 B 22/2;
Novica Petrovski, The Bankruptcy Code, Section 1121: Exclusivity Reloaded, 11 Am. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 451, 453 (2003) ("Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code, is a very powerful tool for
debtors"). "Although reductions are rarely granted, a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession is almost
routinely permitted to extend its exclusive periods at least once, and additional extensions are
not uncommon, particularly in relatively large, complex cases." Richard M. Cieri, Scott J.
Davido, and Heather Lennox, Applying an Ax When a Scalpel Will Do: The Role of Exclusivity
in Chapter 11 Reform, 2 J. BANKR. L. AND PRAC. 397, 410 (1993).
52. The range of "first day orders" is defined only by the character of the debtor's business
and the scope of its financial problems. Bankruptcy brings some substantive rights that may
need to be invoked at the outset. Access to "cash collateral" [a term defined by Bankruptcy
Code § 363(a)] may be immediate according to Federal R. Bankr. P. 4001(1)(b). The debtor has
the right to reject or assume executory contracts or leases in Bankruptcy Code § 365, and the
survival of a franchise may require closing of a number of leased outlets immediately. The
debtor can obtain financing with graduated levels of protection in Bankruptcy Code § 364, in-
cluding priming other liens.
There are likely to be a number of operational issues for which immediate authorization is
needed. These include cash management issues such as opening bank accounts or investing
funds pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 345; giving adequate assurance to utilities as required by
Bankruptcy Code § 366; and may include special problems like paying custom duties, or honor-
ing customer warranty claims, gift certificates or lay-a-way plans.
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Gap Period. The time of involuntary petitions between the filing of
the petition commencing the case and the dismissal or entry of an or-
der for relief.53
Gerrymander. "...[T]hou shalt not classify similar claims differ-
ently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization
plan."54 What are "substantially similar... claims" within Bankruptcy
Code section 1122(a) when the Chapter 11 plan confirmation process
There are urgent administrative matters to be raised in the "first day order" package. Em-
ployment of lawyers or other professionals require court approval under Bankruptcy Code
§ 327. If there are brother-sister, or parent-subsidiary entities, an order for joint administration
of the cases under F.R.B.P. 1015 may be essential. If the debtor is a large enterprise with many
claims anticipated, retaining a claim agent may be needed because the bankruptcy clerks' office
cannot handle the expected volume.
Sometimes the "first day orders" raise more controversial issues about the payment of pre-
petition claims. The doctrine of necessity is the equitable ground which the court may invoke
under Bankruptcy Code § 105(a) to allow payment to critical vendors. How far the doctrine will
reach is the question which each court has to decide. For example the court denied any author-
ity to go beyond statutory priorities in In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405 (E.D. N.C. 1986) (priority
wage claims could be paid but not trade claims). Compare, however, In re Just for Feet, Inc., 241
B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. DE 1999) which allows payment of vendors of popular brands like Nike,
New Balance, Reebok, Adidas because customers will not come to the debtor's stores without
such stock. The toolmakers supplying debtors' divisions were paid in In re Eagle-Picher Indus-
tries, Inc., 124 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) to enable debtor to survive in a highly compet-
itive environment. Wages and benefits for active employees were authorized in In re Ionosphere
Club, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) but striking employees could not be paid.
53. In voluntary petitions in bankruptcy, the filing of the petition commencing the case auto-
matically results in an order for relief. Bankruptcy Code § 301. However, involuntary petitions
require adjudication of the petition allegations putting the order for relief in abeyance. Bank-
ruptcy Code § 303(h). Transactions with the debtor during the gap period are perilous. E.g., In
re Bankvest Capital Corp., 375 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004) (payments by debtor to its bank during
gap period, which bank transferred to purchaser of loan portfolios, would not be recoverable,
assuming that they were in violation of the automatic stay, even if avoidable as post-petition
transfers prohibited by Bankruptcy Code § 549, because bank's status under Bankruptcy Code
§ 502(h) would give bank priority).
54. Matter of Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th cir. 1992) (as amended on
rehearing), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992) (the deficiency claim created by Bankruptcy Code
§ 1111(b) is not properly classified separately from the unsecured creditor class). The courts
agree that motivation to juggle class membership to achieve plan confirmation is not an appro-
priate application of Bankruptcy Code § 1122(a). E.g. In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied 117 S.Ct. 1312, and reh'g denied, 117 S.Ct. 1725 (1997); In re Boston Post
Road Ltd., 21 F.3d 477 (2nd Cit. 1994), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 897 (1994); John Hancock Mutual
Life. Insur. Co .v. Route 37 Bus. Park Ass'n., 987 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1993); Matter of Lumber
Exchange Bldg. Ltd., 968 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1992); and In re Bryson Properties XVIII, 961 F.2d
496 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 191 (1992). As the preceding cases illustrate, much of
the discussion centers on Bankruptcy Code § 1111(b) which gives distinctive treatment to se-
cured claims held without recourse so that the secured party's rights can arise only in a Chapter
11 case and not under applicable state law. The provision has special importance in single-asset
real estate cases. David Gray Carlson, Chapter 11 Issues: The Classification Veto in Single-Asset
Cases Under Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(10), 44 S.C. L. REv. 565 (1993) (there is distinc-
tion between trade credit and deficiency of secured credit that legitimizes separate classification
of the unsecured claims).
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requires voting by the weighted majorities of classes or interests de-
scribed in Bankruptcy Code section 1126?55
Go naked. The professional who avoids paying high premiums for
malpractice insurance and places all assets in other hands, such as
family members or trusts, that tort creditors will not be able to reach,
or will be discouraged from reaching.
56
Going concern bonus. See, reorganization bonus.
Indubitable equivalent. A term of art originating in the case of In re
Muriel Holding Corp, where Judge Learned Hand held that the stay
imposed under former Bankruptcy Act section 77B (11 USC sec. 207)
must be lifted because the reorganization plan failed to give the se-
cured creditor the indubitable equivalent of its mortgage interest.
57
The concept is embodied in Bankruptcy Code section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). See, cramdown.
Bankruptcy Code section 361(3) picks up the term as one of the
standards by which the debtor proposes to adequately protect the se-
cured party who seeks relief from the automatic stay. It is not a de-
fined term and is not limited to application in that section.
Ipso facto clause. A contract provision automatically terminating
the contract upon the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding of a party.
These clauses are ineffective to stop an executory contract or
unexpired lease, Bankruptcy Code section 365(e); or to prevent the
estate from using or selling assets, Bankruptcy Code section 363(l).58
55. Steelcase Inc. v. Johnston, 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowed the separate classification
of the one creditor objecting to the plan because a pending lawsuit with the debtor affected the
amount of its claim). In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (permitting the separate
classification of the Teamsters for claims arising from rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement. The single class designation prevented the Teamsters from dominating the un-
secured creditor class).
56. See, e.g. In re Goldenberg, 253 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (nearly three and one-half mil-
lion dollars in IRA's and single premium annuities were exempt under Florida law for surgeon
who filed chapter 7 petition on the day state malpractice action was submitted to the jury after
being certified to the Florida Supreme Court.) Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.
2001). Matter of Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1989) (dismiss the petition of ophthalmologist
who created tenancy by the entireties to avoid malpractice judgment). Alan Bloom, Greg
Davidian, William Ginsberg, Insurance: Going Naked or Going in Style, 13 WHTLriER L. REV.
445 (1992). (risk management strategies include going without insurance or self-insuring). David
J. Morrow, Key to a Cozier Bankruptcy: Location, Location, Location, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998,
at Al (Dr. Garcia-Rivera carries no malpractice insurance and protects $500,000 home through
Florida homestead).
57. 75 F.2nd 941 (2nd Cir. 1935)
58. See, e.g., Days Inn of America, Inc. v. 161 Hotel Group, Inc., 55 Conn. App. 118, 739 A.2d
280 (Conn. Ct. App. 1999) (ipso facto clause in hotel franchise, ineffective in bankruptcy, could
not shield guarantor of franchisee from its guaranty after franchisee filed bankruptcy). While
simple to state, the application of and exceptions to the rules bristle with issues. Is the contract
executory? Has the lease been effectively terminated prior to bankruptcy? Is it a contract for
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Jurisdiction by ambush. The bankruptcy court, a non-Article III
court, can finally decide a non-core judicial matter if the parties con-
sent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).
Consent should be affirmative on the record. It should not rest on
failure to object.5 9
Lien Stripping. Valuing the collateral and proposing in the plan to
satisfy the lien when that value has been paid. The remaining defi-
ciency on the debt is an unsecured claim receiving whatever percent-
age the class of unsecured claims is paid under the plan. More
precisely, the Chapter 13 debtors sought to modify the home mort-
gage but the Supreme Court held in Nobelman v. American Savings
Bank that Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b)(2) prohibited modifying
the rights of creditors whose secured claim was only upon the debtor's
principal residence. 60 Compare, strip off.
financial accommodation such as a loan commitment? Is it a contract for personal service that is
non-delegable such as lead baritone at the Met on Saturday? See, e.g., Summit Invest. and Dev.
Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995) (ipso facto clause in partnership agreement was
ineffective even though state partnership law terminated upon bankruptcy; and exception for
non-assignment law in § 365(e)(2) did not track amendment of § 365(c) (1)(A) barring hypothet-
ical assignment).
59. The following cases are wrong: In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 946 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1991)(assuming that noncore proceeding was at issue, failure to object to final jurisdiction was con-
sent); In re Men's Sportswear, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134 (2nd Cir. 1987) (consent to jurisdiction over
contract breach action inferred from the failure to object); and In re Daniels-Head & Assoc., 819
F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1987). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008(a) (last sentence) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b)
(last sentence) make clear the requirement for express consent. "Jurisdiction by ambush" de-
scribed the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court before
the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. It was a trap for the unwary prior to the Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy Act § 2 (11 U.S.C. § 11) (repealed 1978) and Bankruptcy Act § 23a (11 U.S.C.
§ 46a) (repealed 1978) involved constructive possession and consent by failure to object. JAMES
ANGELL MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 194 et. seq. (West 1956)
and George Treister, Bankruptcy Court Summary Jurisdiction, 36 CAL. STATE B. J. 1085 (1961).
"Jurisdiction by ambush" has been inappropriately applied to the jurisdiction which the bank-
ruptcy court asserts over the counterclaim filed against the creditor's proof of claim. See, e.g. In
re EXDS, Inc., 301 B.R. 436 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (by filing proof of claim, creditor submitted
to the equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and was not entitled to trial by jury); and In re
County of Orange, 203 B.R. 977 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (creditor submitted itself to summary
jurisdiction for the counterclaim for breach of contract and malpractice by filing proof of claim;
however, the court allowed the withdrawal of the claim).
60. 508 U.S. 324 (1993). In effect, the Court is reading Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(2) as if it
said: "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than [rights with respect to the se-
cured] claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence."
In 1994 Congress amended Bankruptcy Code §1123(b)(5) to put the same restricting language
in Chapter 11. However, no action was taken to amend Bankruptcy Code § 1222(b)(2) so that
lien stripping of the family farm was upheld in Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574 (8th Cir.
1996).
The debtor may strip off lien of the junior mortgage when there is no equity to support the lien
in Chapter 13. In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Lane, 280 F.3d 663 (6th Cir.
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Marshal assets. A doctrine of equity that a creditor protected by
two sources from which to satisfy a debt should turn first to that
source which will allow other creditors to satisfy their debts, too.
61
Means Test. "How do you like living in Florida, Mr. Bilzerian?"
62
The core of the new legislation recently enacted. 63 The legislation
amends existing Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) which allows dismis-
2002); In re Pond, 252 F.3d 122 (2nd Cir. 2001); In re Dickerson, 222 F.3d 924 (11th Cir. 2000); In
re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000), reh'g en
banc denied, 228 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2000); In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606 (3rd Cir. 2000): In re
Mann, 249 B.R. 831 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2000); and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1997),
appeal dismissed, 192 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1999).
Additional collateral may take the property out of the "only...debtor's principal residence"
category: See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("any
and all appliances, machinery, furniture and equipment" went beyond the residence). Other ex-
amples include: In re Bouvier, 160 B.R. 24 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1993) (business assets of the debtor's
corporation); In re Hammond, 156 B.R. 943 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (appliances, furniture and
equipment); In re Reeves, 65 B.R. 898 (N.D. I11. 1986) (fixtures); In re Ramirez, 62 B.R. 668
1986) (rental units); In re Morphis, 30 B.R. 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (house and adjoining
lot); In re Green, 7 B.R. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); and In re Baksa, 5 B.R. 184 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1980) (cars and furniture). Boilerplate may or may not be permissible. In re Davis, 689
F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993) (boilerplate "rents, royalties, profits and fixtures" does go beyond the
residence); but see In re Hirsch, 155 B.R. 688(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that the boilerplate
is within the category). Insurance is another disputed issue. See, e.g., Transmouth Fin. Corp. v.
Hill, 106 B.R. 145 (W.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Wilson. 91 B.R. 74 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); and
United Co. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980) (ruling that taking life
insurance as collateral makes the mortgage vulnerable to modification.) Matter of Washington,
967 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1992); but see In re Williams, 161 B.R. 27 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993): see also
In re Davis, 989 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993) (fire insurance is not collateral other than the principal
residence of the debtor).
61. See, e.g. In re Enfolinc, Inc., 233 B.R. 351 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) (refusing to order mar-
shalling when the creditor held a priority security interest in the corporate debtor assets and
principals of the debtor assigned certificates of deposit to the creditor. The creditor did not hold
two sources of the same debtor); First Nat'l Mercantile Bank and Trust Co. v. Hazen, 96 B.R. 924
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (secured party could be ordered to seek satisfaction first out of second
mortgage upon property which the trustee of the debtor had no claim). The doctrine is a corol-
lary of the equitable maxim, "equality is equity." GEORGE NORTON POMEROY, 1 POMEROY'S
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 410 (4th ed. 1918); and GEORGE L. CLARK, EQUITY, § 369 (1954).
62. Philip Shenon, Home Exemptions Snag Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2001. Al
(Paul Bilzerian has filed second bankruptcy with $140 million of listed debts but retains $5 mil-
lion home he calls "Taj Mahal" under Florida homestead laws).
63. H.R. 685 and S. 256, 109th Cong. 1st Sess., Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (enacted); H.R. 975 and S. 1920, 108th Cong.
1st Sess., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2004; H.R. 333 and S.
220, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevent and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, 107th Cong. 1st Sess;
H.R. 333 and S. 220 are identical to H.R. 2415, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000. H.R. 2415
passed the House in a voice vote and the Senate 70 to 28 but was pocket vetoed by President
Clinton on December 19, 2000. H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess, was the conference replace-
ment of S. 625 and H.R. 833. H.R. 833 and S. 625 were separately passed in May of 1999, but did
not come out of conference before the end of the 1st Session of the 106th Congress. These bills
were replacements of H.R. 3150 and S. 1301, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (1998), which were passed in
the Fall of 1998, but did not come out of conference before the end of the 2nd Session of the
105th Congress. H.R. 3150 was a successor to H.R. 2500 introduced in the Fall of 1997.
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sal of the consumer Chapter 7 petition if the court finds that it would
be a "substantial abuse". In defining "substantial abuse" courts have
applied a kind of "means test", viz., does the debtor have the re-
sources to make payments to creditors through a Chapter 13 plan?64
The judicial expression of substantial abuse will be obviated by the
elaborate statutory definition when the statute becomes effective six
months after enactment.
National Bankruptcy Court of Delaware. Because Delaware is the
state of incorporation for many large corporations, venue laid in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware is dispropor-
tionate. This enables Delaware bankruptcy courts to shape the busi-
ness reorganization process. 65
146 Cong. Rec. S11683-02, S11702, 2000 WL 1796598 (Cong. Rec.), Proceedings for 106th
Cong. 2nd Sess., December 7, 2000, explains the proposed means test in the floor debate.
Amongst the extensive literature analyzing the proposals is: Jean Braucher and Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather than Means Testing, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. J. 6 (2003)
(surcharge chapter 7 debtors with higher income); Rebecca M. Burns, Killing Them With Kind-
ness: How Congress Imperils Women and Children in Bankruptcy Under the Facade of Protec-
tion, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 203 (2002) (proposed reform will impact women and children
negatively); Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 27 (1999) (97% of Chapter 7 debtors had too little income to repay even 20% of their
unsecured debts over a five year period); and Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for
Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177 (1999) (only fair that persons able to pay creditors should
do so).
64. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 212 F.3d 395 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 564 (2000) (pen-
sion which is excluded from the estate as an asset should be counted as income available to pay
creditors); In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1999) (the totality of the debtor-physician's
circumstances, including choosing lower income fellowship, established his ability to pay credi-
tors); In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778 (2nd Cir. 1999) (exempt pension should be factored into
hypothetical chapter 13 plan); In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998)(Living at home with
parents gave debtor $770 monthly income above expenses); In re Koch, 109 F.3d 1285 (8th Cir.
1997) (exempt workmens' compensation should be factored into hypothetical Chapter 13 plan);
In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989) (debtor had future income that would help to pay
creditors); and In re Kelly, 841 F.1d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) (attorney had substantial income above
expenses).
65. Lynn LocPucki, testimony before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (July 21, 2004), 2004 WL 84558186 (rise of
filings of large publicly held companies in the Delaware bankruptcy court to 34% of all of such
filings by 2000 and recommending change in the venue rules for bankruptcy cases). Lynn
LoPucki, Courting Failure. How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts
(Univ. of Mich. 2005) (state and judicial interest in corralling large bankruptcy cases). Lynn M.
LoPucki and Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New
York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND L. REV. 231 (2001) (outcome
measures indicate that creditors are not benefitted by business reorganization in Delaware bank-
ruptcy court); Theodore Eisenberg and Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999)
(sizable percentage of large corporations in bankruptcy reorganize in Delaware bankruptcy
court); but see, Barry E. Adler and Henry N. Butler, On the "Delawarization of Bankruptcy"
Debate, 52 EMORY L. J. 1309 (2003) (the evidence of a competition for the bankruptcy business
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New value. A controversial exception to the absolute priority rule
by which equity interests may purchase their participation in the reor-
ganized corporation when the plan is forced on the participants by
cramdown.66
Negative Amortization. A plan in which the payments do not amor-
tize the debt initially but with higher interest rate and possible balloon
payment at the end. 67
New debtor syndrome. The creation of an entity burdened with
debt close to the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.68
No asset case. The filed schedules in a Chapter 7 case indicate that
no dividend will be available for creditors. Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure 2002(e) provides that the clerk will so advise in the
notice of the first meeting of creditors and that creditors should not
file a proof of claim.69 Statistically, the overwhelming majority of con-
is not that stark or destructive). S. 314, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation
Act of 2005 proposes to revise the venue rules in bankruptcy.
66. See, e.g., In re Potter Material Serv. Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (the sole shareholder
of the debtor's guarantee of $600,000 secured loan to the debtor coupled with cash that paid
creditors 3% was new value). Other courts finding a new value contribution include: In re U.S.
Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984)
and In re Landau Boat Co., 13 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). In re Ambanc La Mesa Ltd.,
115 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1997) finds a contribution of one-half percent too de minimus to constitute
new value. In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992) finds a lien release on equipment and cash
contribution amounting to 2.7% of unsecured claims was not sufficient new value. However, In
re Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990) held
that an off-the-balance-sheet contribution by way of the shareholder's guarantee of new loans
was not sufficient new value assuming that the doctrine existed under the Bankruptcy Code.
The court's dicta doubted that the rule is still viable. In the Matter of Greystone III Joint Ven-
ture, 948 F.2d 134 (as amended on reh'g 1992), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992) held that the new
value was not codified in the Bankruptcy Code, but that portion of the opinion was withdrawn
on rehearing with the dissent of the original judge of the opinion.
The Court has twice addressed the measure of new value contributions without squarely hold-
ing that the doctrine is a corollary to Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); or that the doctrine
was not enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978. Bank of America Nat'l. Trust
and Sav. Assoc. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 119 S.Ct. 1411 (1999) (the debtor's plan
failed to satisfy the absolute priority standard because debtor had the exclusive right to propose
a plan and used values determined by the court rather than the market). Norwest Bank Worth-
ington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (the offer of sweat equity by the reorganizing farmer was
not something of value in the market traded in by creditors).
67. In the Matter of D & F Constr., Inc., 865 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that such a plan
is not "fair and equitable" even if it may literally satisfy the terms of Bankruptcy Code
§ 1129(b)(2)); but see, In re Nauman, 213 B.R. 355 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997) which holds that the
debtor's Chapter 12 plan was feasible even though property was negatively amortized.
68. E.g., In re Duvar Apt., Inc., 205 B.R. 196 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (affirmed lift of the auto-
matic stay upon the apartment building which was debtor's sole asset because the creation of the
entity prior to bankruptcy was in bad faith); In re Yukon Enter., Inc., 39 B.R. 919 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1984) (declaring such to be presumptively in bad faith and subject to dismissal).
69. If subsequently assets are recovered, a new notice will be sent to creditors advising them
to submit claims within 90 days. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 3002(c)(5).
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sumer Chapter 7 bankruptcies are no asset or nominal asset cases. Cf.
Nominal asset case.
Nominal asset case. The filed schedules and disclosures at the first
meeting of creditors indicate that administrative expense and other
priorities in Bankruptcy Code sections 503 and 507 will exhaust
whatever assets are disclosed. There will be no dividend for general
creditors.
Notice and hearing. Sometimes known as a scream or die. The ref-
erence to action taken "on notice and a hearing" is ubiquitous in
bankruptcy. 70 It does not mean that a hearing will be conducted to
take evidence and argument on the proposed action. The party re-
ceiving the notice has the burden of seeking a hearing. Bankruptcy
Code section 102(1)(B).
Percentage Plan. A plan promising to pay creditors a percentage of
their claims. E.g. "The plan will pay members of the class 10% of
their allowed claims. '71 Compare, Pot Plan.
Period of exclusivity. See, exclusivity.
Pot Plan. A plan promising to pay a stated sum over a period of
time, or a "pot of money" for creditors. E.g., "The plan will pay $300
each month for 36 months. '72 Compare, Percentage plan.
70. A partial list of examples include: Bankruptcy Code § 362(d) (provide relief from the
automatic stay); Bankruptcy Code §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(2)(B) (sale of certain estate property can be
authorized only after "notice and a hearing"); Bankruptcy Code §§ 364(b),(c), and (d) (Author-
izing the trustee to obtain credit, including credit pursuant to a priming lien); Bankruptcy Code
§ 365(d)(10) (excusing trustee from duty to perform obligations on an equipment lease); Bank-
ruptcy Code § 503(b) (approve administrative expense claims); Bankruptcy Code § 510(c)
(subordinate claims); Bankruptcy Code §§ 554(a) and (b) (abandon property); Bankruptcy Code
§ 706(b) (convert Chapter 7 case to Chapter 11); Bankruptcy Code § 725 (disposes of encum-
bered property); Bankruptcy Code § 1108 (terminate authority to operates business in chapter
11); Bankruptcy Code § 1121(d) (extend or shorten the debtor's period of exclusivity); Bank-
ruptcy Code § 1125(b) (determine that the plan proponent's disclosure statement is adequate);
and Bankruptcy Code § 1127(b) (approve modification of the Chapter 11 plan).
71. See, e.g. Matter of Witowski, 16 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1994) (the plan could be modified
to pay creditors 19% when fewer creditors filed claims than anticipated by the original 10%
plan); In re Phelps, 149 B.R. 534, 537 n.3 ( Bankr. N.D. Il. 1993) (debtor may choose a percent-
age plan or a pot plan).
72. The litigated issue is usually modification of the plan when fewer creditors than antici-
pated bother to file claims. See, e.g., In re Than, 215 B.R. 430, 432 n.2 (B.A. P. 9th Cir. 1976); In
re Powers, 202 B.R. 618 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); Mayer v. Pagano, 2002 WL 31159110 (Bankr. D.
N.D.Calif. 2002); In re Golek, 308 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Ill. 2004) (although phrased as $76 per
month for 36 months, the plan was a percentage plan to achieve 10% achieved early when pro-
ceeds from the sale of debtor's residence were applied); In re Stamm, 265 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2001) (plan for term of 60 months could not be reduced because fewer creditors than
anticipated filed proofs of claim). Reference to a "pot plan" has appeared outside of Chapter
13. See, e.g., In re New York Medical Group, 265 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Creditor
with malpractice claim against Chapter 11 debtor could proceed in state court to establish liabil-
ity of insurer).
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Pre-packaged Plan. Filing Chapter 11 with a plan of reorganization
already negotiated.
There are many advantages. The time before plan confirmation in
Bankruptcy Code section 1141 is drastically reduced, and the pros-
pects for successful reorganization go up as the time in the limbo of
bankruptcy goes down. The plan is obtained largely by consent rather
than by cramdown.
Priming lien. "When this mall is completed, the tenants will be
fighting to get a lease. So, what's another $10 million?"
A lien which is placed in priority to an existing lien.73
Reorganization Bonus. The difference between the value of the
Chapter 11 debtor if reorganized through Chapter 11 or liquidated
through Chapter 7.74
Retention, Surrender, or Reaffirmation. Three statutorily stated
choices open to the consumer debtor, using Chapter 7, regarding col-
lateral pledged to a secured party.75 Compare, Ride through.
73. Bankruptcy Code § 364(d) ("The court...may authorize the obtaining of credit or the
incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate... if the priming lien
is the only credit available and the existing secured creditor is adequately protected"). See, e.g.,
In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 552 (3rd Cir. 1994) (bankruptcy court erred in grant-
ing priming lien to complete golf course and residential project); discussed, Lawrence K. Snider
and Paul B. Lewis, Case and Controversy. Priming Liens and the Undersecured Creditor After In
re Swedeland Development Group, Inc., 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 211 (1995). See also, In re
Reading Tube Ind., 72 B.R. 329 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1987) (priming lien rejected because debtor
failed to show that alternative credit was unavailable); and In re Beker Ind. Corp., 58 B.R. 725
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (priming lien approved because debenture holders were adequately pro-
tected by going concern value and lien on other plants). Cf., James Rogers, The Impairment of
Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relation Between the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983) (the Bankruptcy Clause and not
the Fifth Amendment is the standard for protecting the core expectations of the secured
creditor).
74. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI.
L. REv. 565, 571-72 (1950) (the going concern bonus captured in reorganization); Proposed
Bankruptcy Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Consti-
tutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1938-41 (1976)(testi-
mony of William Rochelle on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference on the going
concern bonus to be protected in business reorganization); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 220 (1977) (purpose of the reorganization proposals to retain going concern bonus).
75. Bankruptcy Code § 521(2) requires the consumer debtor to declare the debtor's inten-
tions, within thirty days, to keep or to return to the secured party the collateral. Bankruptcy
Code § 722 enables the debtor to redeem qualified collateral, including an automobile, by paying
off the secured party a lump sum for value determined by Bankruptcy Code § 506(a). A third
choice is to enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the secured creditor which satisfies the
requirements of Bankruptcy Code § 524( c) and (d). Compare cramdown in Chapter 13 where
the debtor can modify the terms of the secured loan and make installment payments. Till v. SCS
Credit Corp., 124 U.S. 1951 (2004) held that a consumer debtor in Chapter 13 could re-write the
interest rate by a court-approved formula when using Bankruptcy Code §' 1325(a)(5)(B) to re-
tain the debtor's truck.
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Ride through. The secured creditor or the debtor may proceed as if
the bankruptcy petition has not been filed. A secured creditor need
not file a claim, and the plan may ignore the secured creditor. Assum-
ing that the secured claim is not vulnerable to any bankruptcy avoid-
ing power, the secured creditor simply rides through the proceeding.
The secured creditor may enforce its security interest once the auto-
matic stay is terminated.
The debtor may have performed all of the terms of the security
agreement prior to the filing of the petition. May the debtor simply
ride through and continue to meet the terms as if the bankruptcy peti-
tion was never filed? 76  Compare, Retention, Surrender, or
Reaffirmation.
Stalking horse. A bankruptcy sale buyer who is a bidder with the
expectation that other bidders will be interested for a higher price.77
Standing trustee. The United States trustee may designate an indi-
vidual to be standing trustee for all of the cases filed under Chapter
13, Bankruptcy Code section 1302; or filed under Chapter 12, Bank-
ruptcy Code section 1202.78
The question is whether these three statutory choices are the only choices when the consumer
debtor in Chapter 7 has not defaulted on the security agreement prior to filing the bankruptcy
petition? The circuits are completely divided: In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998) (the three
options are exclusive); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996) (the three options are exclu-
sive); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993) (the three options are exclusive); and In re
Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990) (the three options are exclusive). Cf. In re Parker, 139
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 592 (1998) (debtor may continue to make pay-
ments); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43 (2nd Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1055 (1997) (debtor
may continue to make payments); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992) (debtor may
continue to make payments); and Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir.
1989) (debtor may continue to make payments). The new Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 eliminates the debtor's choice to simply continue performance of a
purchase money security interest by an amendment to add Bankruptcy §521(a)(6) to that effect.
Official Form 8 deleted the debtor's statement acknowledging §521(2) because, as the Advi-
sory Committee Notes state, "....the form is not intended to take a position..." on the split in
the cases. To circumvent the restrictive view, some attorneys refuse to sign the statement that
they find it is in the best interest of the debtor to reaffirm. The reaffirmation agreement is not
enforceable in such form. A hearing is then necessary before the bankruptcy court to make the
agreement enforceable. The bankruptcy court can find that the reaffirmation agreement has
been signed so compliance has been achieved even though not enforceable in form. In re Claf-
lin, 249 B.R. 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (holding that this is not satisfactory compliance with the
choice the debtor must make amongst the three options).
76. Id..
77. In re Simon Transportation Services, Inc. 292 BR 207 (Bankr. D. Utah 2003) (insider stalk-
ing horse imposes the burden on the debtor to justify the sound business reason for the sale and
the notice given to interested parties). In re Integrated Resources, Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 750
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[An initial bid that is then 'shopped around' to attract higher offers").
78. 28 U.S.C. § 586 defines the duties of the United States trustee, an office within the De-
partment of Justice. Trustees for cases filed under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 are drawn from a
panel of trustees previously created. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1). If there are a sufficient number of
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Stand alone plan. A plan which is internally funded; it does not
require outside funding.
Strip down. See, lien stripping.
Strip off. If the first mortgage exceeds the value of the property,
should the junior mortgage be eliminated? 79 Compare, lien stripping
Strong arm. The powers granted hypothetically to a trustee under
Bankruptcy Code section 544(a).8Q
Substantive Consolidation. An equitable doctrine which allows the
merging of estates into a single administrative estate, sometimes even
including non-debtor entities into the debtor entity.81
Surcharge the collateral. See carve out.
cases, the United States trustee may appoint a standing trustee for the Chapter 13 or Chapter 12
cases rather than use the panel of trustees.
79. The debtor may not strip off the lien of a junior mortgage when there is no equity to
support the lien in Chapter 7. See, e.g. In re Talbert, 344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003) and Ryan v.
Homecomings Financial Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 2001). Nancy H. Kratzke, Take If Off,
Take It All Off.- The Lien Stripping Dilemma and Judicial Treatment of Wholly Unsecured Junior
Residential Mortgagees under Federal Bankruptcy Laws, 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 4 (2003).
The problem arises in the interaction between Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) and (d), the former
limiting the secured claim "...to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest..."; and the
latter saying that "...the lien is void . . . to the extent that a lien ... is not an allowed secured
claim." Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) allowed secured claim had different meanings in
the two subsections because the Court did not want to transform Bankruptcy Code § 506(d) into
an "avoiding power" finessing other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. This construction sent
Justice Scalia into furious dissent. But the policy that discrete remedies are intended by the
different bankruptcy chapters is upheld.
The debtor may strip off lien of the junior mortgage when there is no equity to support the lien
in Chapter 13. In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Lane, 280 F.3d 663 (6th
Cir.2002); In re Pond, 252 F.3d 122 (2nd Cir.2001); In re Dickerson, 222 F.3d 924 (11th Cir. 2000);
In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000), reh. en
banc denied, 228 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2000); In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606 (3rd Cir. 2000); In re
Mann, 249 B.R. 831 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2000); and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1997),
app. dismissed, 192 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1999).
80. These powers are the rights of a levying creditor and the rights of a bona fide purchaser as
to real property. Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(1) - (3).
81. Substantive consolidation is not specifically authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or by
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. As such it contrasts with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b)
which allows the joint administration of related entities in bankruptcy. The estates are not com-
mingled in joint administration. The joint administration of the bankruptcy estates of husband
and wife is specifically recognized by Bankruptcy Code § 302.
The equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation is readily applied where the debtor and its
wholly owned affiliates have bankruptcy cases pending in the same judicial district. Prior to
bankruptcy the debtors have integrated their management, balance sheets, tax returns, and their
creditors are not distinguishable. In re Richton Int'l Corp., 12 B.R. 555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
As the circumstances move away from the easy cases, the court is asked to balance administra-
tive convenience with the prejudice to creditors who deal separately with the debtor entities: In
re Augie/Restivo Banking Co. Ltd. 860 F.2d 515 (2nd Cir. 1980) and In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc.,
810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (substantive consolidation denied). See also, F.D.I.C. v. Colonial
Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1992) and Eastgroup Prop. v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935
F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991) (substantive consolidation granted).
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Sweat equity. "I'll work hard and use my experience as my share in
the business. That's worth a lot."
For ownership interests to remain after reorganization, the absolute
priority rule requires that secured debt and unsecured debt must be
paid in full or unanimously consent to continued participation by eq-
uity. Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b)(2). Courts have recognized
that excluded ownership may buy back into the business by contribut-
ing new value. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that new value
could consist of the debtor's contribution of labor and experience in
Norwest Bank of Worthington v. Ahlers. 82
Two track. A term of opprobrium for the cumbersome process
ante-dating the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. Bankruptcy Act,
Chapter XI and Chapter X, imagined more informal and more elabo-
rate procedures for small versus large, publicly held corporations.
Chapter XII was designed for limited partnerships typically operating
office and apartment buildings or malls. The rallying cry of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was a single Chapter 11 business
reorganization. 83
Special concern about the small, closely held corporation and the
single-asset real estate debtor typically operating an apartment or
shopping center, resulted in amendment in 1994 to define "single asset
real estate" and "small business debtor. ' 84 The small business and
The extreme reach of the doctrine is the consolidation of non-debtor entities with the debtor
entity. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, reh'g denied, 313 U.S. 600
(1941) and In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2000) (substantive consolidation of the debtor's
wholly owned corporation who are not debtors into the debtor's estate because assets are com-
mingled and creditors had no credible claim to reliance upon separate entities). Substantive
consolidation of non-debtor entities has the obvious consequence of finessing the procedure for
involuntary bankruptcy provided by Bankruptcy Code § 303.
Also, Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 381 (1998); Christopher Predko, Substantive Consolidation Involving Non-Debtors: Con-
ceptual and Jurisdictional Difficulties in Bankruptcy, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1741 (1995); J. Stephen
Gilbert, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43 VAND. L. REV. 207 (1990); and
Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive Consolidation Is-
sue, 44 Bus. LAW. 1223 (1989).
82. 485 U.S. 197 (1988). Under the prior Bankruptcy Act, Justice Douglas wrote for a unani-
mous Court in Case v. L.A. Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106, rehg denied, 308 U.S. 637 (1939)
that a plan which allowed the shareholders to retain an interest because their familiarity with the
business, financial standing and influence was essential to its success, was not a fair and equitable
plan. In dictum he said that the proper payment of new value would allow the shareholders to
retain an interest in the reorganized company.
83. E.g., Peter Coogan, A Debtor's Choice of a "Chapter" Rehabilitation Proceeding under the
"Bankruptcy Act", 1 VT. L. REv. 117 (1976); Lawrence King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L. J. 107, 107-109 (1979); and Ronald Trust and Lawrence King, Congress
and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977, 33 Bus. LAW. 489, 529-57 (1978).
84. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 103rd Cong. 2nd Sess, Pub. L. 103-394
(October 22, 1994) codified in part as Bankruptcy Code § 101(51B) and 101(51C).
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single-asset real estate debtor may be subject to different criteria in
Chapter 11 reorganization. 85
Vulture fund. An investment group specializing in bankrupt compa-
nies. One investment strategy is to control the reorganization by ac-
quiring sufficient claims to control the voting. The assets of the
reorganized debtor are sold off. The strategy assumes that creditors
will sell their claims for a pittance to be done with the debtor. There
is some discussion about good faith and disclosure but Bankruptcy
Rule 3001 supports a caveat emptor approach.8 6
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy is a Carrollian world where language demands explica-
tion. Dewsnup v. Timm is an example.8 7 Bankruptcy Code section
506(a) defines an "allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien" as the
".. .. value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property." The Chapter 7 debtors borrowed $119,000 on their farm in
1978, but farm decline dropped the land value to $39,000 when the
bankruptcy court valued the land in 1987. The debtors pointed to
Bankruptcy Code section 506(d) which declared that "To the extent
that a lien secures a claim.. .that is not an allowed secured claim, such
a lien is void.... ." The debtors asked the court to void the $87,000 no
longer secured by the farm land values as the Third Circuit allowed.88
In the vernacular, the debtors asked the court to pair down or lien
strip the excess. Justice Blackmun, for the majority, held that a Chap-
85. E.g., Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(3) expediting relief from the automatic stay for the single
asset real estate debtor; and Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)(2) gives special recognition to the pre-
petition security interest in rents and hotel receipts. As to the small business debtor, Bankruptcy
Code § 1102(a)(3) permits dispensing with the creditors' committee; Bankruptcy Code § 1121(e)
shortens the time for plan proposal; and Bankruptcy Code § 1125(f) permits faster plan disclo-
sure and confirmation. As to all business entities, Bankruptcy Code § 105(d) specifies powers of
case management for the bankruptcy judge.
86. Amongst the voluminous literature, the following describes the scope of the market and
raise various theories of fairness to the different interests affected. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas
M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1 (1990); Michael H. Whitaker, Regulating Claims Trading in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: A
Proposal for Mandatory Disclosure, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 303 (1993); Victor Brudney,
Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1821 (1992); Andrew Africk, Comment: Trading Claims in Chapter 11; How Much Influence Can
be Purchased in Good Faith Under Section 1126( c)?, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1393 (1991).
87. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
88. Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 889 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Chapter 7
debtors could avoid the lien on their residence to the amount exceeding its value because that
would be the same effect if they liquidated the property). The ruling is abrogated by Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) and Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 403 U.S. 324 (1993)
(Chapter 13 debtors are barred from modifying the rights of secured creditors claiming only the
debtor's principal residence.)
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ter 7 debtor could not lien strip because "allowed secured claim" did
not have the same meaning in section 506(a) as in section 506(d). 89 A
fuming Justice Scalia said that ". . .[T]he Court replaces what Con-
gress said with what it thinks Congress ought to have said. . . ."9o 61
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,
'It means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.' 'The
question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many
different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to
be master - that's all." 91
89. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 and n3. ("Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether the
words 'allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code").
90. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss, HUmpTY DUMPry 238 (Tudor Publishing 1944).
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